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HOLY WAR: IN THE NAME OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, CALIFORNIA EXEMPTS CHURCHES
FROM HISTORIC PRESERVATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In California the power to designate historic landmarks,
with or without the property owner's permission, has rested
with cities and counties for decades.1 In 1994, against a
backdrop of widely divergent court decisions 2 and growing
controversy,3 historic preservation in California changed dra-
matically. At the urging of the Catholic Diocese of San Fran-
cisco, 4 the State Legislature passed Assembly Bill 133, which
gave religious organizations absolute control over whether
1. The power to designate historic landmarks was given to cities in 1957
under California Government Code § 37361, subdivision (b), which reads, in
part, that legislatures may "provide for places, buildings, structures, works of
art, and other objects, having a special character or special historical or aes-
thetic interest or value, special conditions or regulations for their protection,
enhancement, perpetuation or use . ..." CAL. GOVT CODE § 37361 (Deering
Supp. 1995). In nearly identical language, the power to designate historic
landmarks was given to counties in 1963 under California Government Code
§ 25373, subdivision (b), which reads, in part, that county boards of supervisors
are authorized to "provide special conditions or regulations for the protection,
enhancement, perpetuation, or use of places, sites, buildings, structures, works
of art and other objects having a special character or special historical or aes-
thetic interest or value . . . ." CAL. GOVT CODE § 25373 (Deering 1995).
2. Compare Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of Saint Barthol-
omew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d. Cir. 1990) (finding that a
historic preservation ordinance did not burden church's free exercise), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) [hereinafter Saint Bartholomew's] with City of Seattle
v. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990)("First Cove-
nant IM), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), affd on reh'g, 840 P.2d
174 (Wash. 1992) (finding that historic preservation did burden church's free
exercise) ("First Covenant II").
3. See, e.g., First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Examiner
for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 887 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (part of the continuing battle over whether churches in Seattle can be
designated landmarks), modified, No. 33408-5-I, 1995 Wash. App. LEXIS 88, at
"1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1995).
4. Gerald D. Adams, Suit Challenges Ban of Church Preservation, S.F. Ex-
AMINER, May 11, 1995, at A4 ("[Assembly Speaker] Brown wrote the legislation
at the request of the archdiocese and the San Francisco Interfaith Council.").
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their property could be historically designated.5 No other
property owners have this power.
In response to the passage of AB 133, a non-profit devel-
opment corporation, preservationists, and the City and
County of San Francisco7 filed suit against the State of Cali-
fornia, claiming that AB 133 is unconstitutional and should
be overturned." The suit argued, in part, that the law "im-
properly elevates the status of [religious] organizations above
secular property owners" and that the power granted "is be-
yond the scope of' any permissible protection of religious be-
liefs,9 thereby violating the Establishment Clause1 ° of both
5. Assembly Bill 133 ("AB 133") is codified as 1994 Cal. Stat. ch 1199 § 1.
Subdivision (d) of California Government Code § 25373 and subdivision (c)
of California Government Code § 37361 were amended to read, in part:
Subdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by
any association or corporation that is religiously affiliated and not or-
ganized for private profit, whether the corporation is organized as a
religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided that
both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the sub-
division to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it
will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the asso-
ciation or corporation of economic return on its property, the rea-
sonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in
the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 25373, 37361 (Deering Supp. 1995).
Subdivision (e) of §§ 25373 and 37361 was amended to read, in part:
Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to infringe on the au-
thority of any legislative body to enforce special conditions and regula-
tions on any property designated prior to January 1, 1994, or to au-
thorize any legislative body to override the determination made
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision 84(d).
Id.
6. See supra note 5.
7. Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
No. 95AS02560 (Ca. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996) (stating additional plaintiffs as:
Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, The Los Angeles Con-
servancy, California Preservation Foundation, California Planning and Conser-
vation League, California Chapter American Planning Association, National Al-
liance of Preservation Commissions, National Trust for Historic Preservation,
and The City and County of San Francisco). Summary judgment was granted
to the plaintiffs without comment on April 5, 1996; the State is appealing that
decision. East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560, slip
op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996), appeal docketed, No. C024192 (3rd Cal. Ct.
App. July 8, 1996).
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 8.
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the state11 and federal 12 constitutions. Summary judgment
granted to the plaintiffs without comment is being appealed
by the State. 13 Meanwhile, the issue of whether the historic
preservation of churches is constitutional, or whether AB 133
is constitutional, remains unanswered. In fact, the contro-
versy continues in at least two California cities: Los Ange-
les"4 and Berkeley.15
This comment first examines the background of the con-
troversy over the historic preservation of churches, including
the development of historic preservation' 6 and its legal ba-
sis.' 7 The process of historic designation and its impact on
religious organizations, central to the controversy, is de-
tailed."8 Recent case law and legislative efforts to alter the
historic preservation of churches, both of which contribute to
the current confusion surrounding the historic preservation
10. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without
discrimination or preference are guaranteed .... The Legislature shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
11. Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at 21-22, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v.
California, No. 95AS02560 (Ca. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
12. Id. at 11-21.
13. See supra note 7.
14. The Roman Catholic archdiocese of Los Angeles is pushing to replace an
earthquake damaged, 120-year-old church with a "massive new cathedral com-
plex." Pamela Kramer, L.A. Crusade: A City Poor in Monuments Sees Church-
State Struggle over Crumbling Cathedral, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, June 26, 1996,
at Al, A6. The Los Angeles Conservancy, a group of historic preservationists,
has won an injunction temporarily halting the church's demolition. Id. Com-
ments on the controversy by those described as "First Amendment expert[s]"
reflect the current uncertainty in this area of law. Id. A law school dean, Ed
Gaffney, said: "This is at the very heart of the First Amendment .... I'm
frankly amazed the government thinks they can control the worship by a reli-
gious community." Id. Another lawyer disagreed: "This isn't a religious-prac-
tice issue .... This is an edifice issue." Id.
15. A Berkeley church wants to tear down a 90-year-old historically desig-
nated apartment building to make room for expanded administrative offices
and social service programs. Will Harper, Church Sues City Over Landmark-
ing, THE BERKELEY VOICE, June 27, 1996, at 1. Because the building is historic,
the city is requiring that the church pay for an expensive environmental impact
report before the building may be demolished. Id. The congregation has filed a
suit challenging the building's landmark designation, with its attorney arguing
that "[tihe city's aesthetic interests can't override the First Amendment right to
freedom of religion." Id.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Parts II.C-D.
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of religious property, are outlined.19 After exploring the his-
tory and provisions of AB 133, the constitutional issues
raised by its passage are examined.2 °
The specific problem addressed by this comment is
whether AB 133 and other blanket exemptions of churches
from historic preservation are constitutional, 21 a question
that remains unanswered even now that summary judgment
has been granted to the plaintiffs in East Bay Asian Local
Dev. Corp. v. California.22 Necessarily, the analysis includes
consideration of whether the historic preservation of church-
owned property is itself constitutional, an issue of ongoing
controversy. 23 An analysis of related case law and the conclu-
sion that AB 133 likely violates the Establishment Clauses of
the federal and state constitutions,24 is followed by proposed
guidelines for alternative legislation.25 This proposal for leg-
islation balances free exercise burdens with Establishment
Clause concerns and would create a more uniform scheme for
the historic preservation of California churches.
26
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Historic Preservation
At first glance, historic preservation seems innocuous
enough-local government designates buildings and districts
of historical, architectural, or cultural significance for special
treatment in order to preserve the area's historical and cul-
tural foundations.2 7 For decades, historic preservation has
enjoyed widespread support at all levels of government 28 and
19. See discussion infra Parts II.E-F.
20. See discussion infra Parts II.G-H.
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. See East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs).
23. See supra notes 15-16.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. See discussion infra Part V.
27. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129
(1978) (finding that "preserving structures and areas with special historic, ar-
chitectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental
goal").
28. See National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. 89-665, Oct. 15, 1966,
80 Stat. 915 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (Supp. 1988)); Alan C. Wein-
stein, The Myth of Ministry vs. Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of
Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP. L.REv. 91, 98-99
(1992) (discussing the history of historic preservation legislation).
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in the courts.2 9 By the time Congress passed the National
Historic Preservation Act in 1966,10 every state had enacted
legislation authorizing historic preservation. 31 Today, nearly
two thousand municipalities across the country have local or-
dinances designed to protect, designate, and regulate historic
districts and individual landmarks.32 In addition, the United
State Supreme Court has clearly recognized that historic
preservation advances a legitimate state interest.
33
B. The Legal Basis for Historic Preservation
Historic preservation is a form of land use regulation
3 4
authorized by the state3 5 and largely controlled at the local
government level.36 The United States Supreme Court has
found that the power of municipalities to designate historic
landmarks is based in their police power over affairs of
safety, health, and welfare.37 California's Supreme Court has
also recognized the police power of local government to regu-
late physical and aesthetic values.38 The power to designate
landmarks in California has been statutorily vested with cit-
ies since 1957 and with counties since 1963. 39
C. The Process and Impact of Landmark Designation
Local preservation ordinances are usually administered
by a board or commission, whose members are often ap-
pointed by the mayor.40 To be eligible for landmark status, a
29. Penn, 438 U.S. at 104.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (Supp. 1988).
31. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 98.
32. Id.
33. Penn, 438 U.S. at 129.
34. Angela C. Carmella, Landmark Preservation of Church Property, 34
CATH. LAw. 41, 42 (1991).
35. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373, 37361, supra note 1.
36. Carmella, supra note 34, at 42 (noting that "for the most part... preser-
vation is . . . administered at the municipal level").
37. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (describing the scope of
police power over municipal affairs as being "broad and inclusive .... The val-
ues it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary.").
38. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 861 (1980) (ac-
knowledging authority of cities to regulate physical and aesthetic values under
their police powers), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981).
39. CAL. GovT CODE §§ 25373, 37361, supra note 1.
40. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 100.
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property must have architectural, historic, or cultural
value.41 Some local ordinances require that buildings meet a
minimum age requirement;42 others waive the age require-
ment as long as the property is of exceptional importance.43
Depending on the local ordinance, a variety of people may be
allowed to recommend a building for designation: the prop-
erty's owner, preservation organizations, or simply an inter-
ested person.44
After a request for designation is made, the building is
evaluated by experts to determine whether it meets the re-
quirements of the ordinance for designation.45 A public, gov-
ernmental hearing is held on the proposed landmark,4 6 and
the designation decision is made either by the commission or
by the city council on the recommendation of the commis-
sion.47 Generally, a property owner need not agree to the
designation,48 although some ordinances include hardship ex-
emptions or other procedural protections if the owner
objects.49
When a property is designated a landmark, usually only
the exterior of the building is included,50 and the mainte-
nance or restoration burden on the owner may be minimal5 '
or great.52 Often the property's owner is prohibited from de-
molishing, altering, or renovating the property without prior
approval of the local preservation commission. 53 If the com-
mission declines to approve changes proposed by the owner,
most local ordinances allow for an appeal, either to a city
council or municipal court.54
41. Carmella, supra note 34, at 43.
42. Id. (noting that in some municipalities, "a building must... be at least
twenty-five, fifty, or . . . seventy-five years old to be eligible for landmark
status").
43. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 101.
44. Carmella, supra note 34, at 44.
45. Id. at 44-45.
46. Id. at 45.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Carmella, supra note 34, at 45.
50. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 102.
51. Id.
52. Carmella, supra note 34, at 51 (noting that landmark preservation nor-
mally "requires maintenance ... above and beyond what is required under
safety-based regulations").
53. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 102-03.
54. Id. at 104.
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D. The Tension Between Churches and Historic
Preservation
Because churches are often architecturally, histori-
cally, or culturally significant,56 they are prime candidates
for historic preservation. 7 But churches have fiercely fought
landmark designation at times, citing violations of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise 58 and Establishment Clauses5 9
and the Fifth Amendment's ban on takings.6 ° In recent years
the battle has heated up, 61 and the law surrounding the his-
toric preservation of churches has become extremely unset-
tled.62 With little direction from the United States Supreme
Court, which has never ruled specifically on the historic
designation of church property,63 state supreme courts64 and
a variety of state65 and local66 legislative acts have attempted
to address the controversy.
55. In this comment, the use of "church" to describe a structure denotes
church, temple, mosque, or other building used for religious ceremonies or
worship.
56. Carmella, supra note 34, at 44.
57. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 110.
58. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 353 (arguing that New York
City's landmarks law "substantially burdens religion in violation of the First
Amendment").
59. Id. at 352 (arguing that the landmarks law violates the Establishment
Clause by "entangling the government in religious affairs").
60. Id.
61. Three of the many cases challenging the historic preservation of
churches in the 1990's are: Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2; First Covenant
I, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1991),
affd on reh'g, First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); First United Meth-
odist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle Landmarks Preser-
vation Bd., 887 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), modified, No. 33408-5-I, 1995
Wash. App. LEXIS 88, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1995).
62. In combination, three cases reflect the unsettled state of the law in this
area. In Saint Bartholomew's, a federal court found that historic designation of
a church did not violate the Federal Constitution. Saint Bartholomew's, supra
note 2, at 353. However, in First Covenant, a state supreme court found that
landmark designation of a church violated the federal and state constitutions.
First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174, 174 (Wash. 1992). Yet, in First United Meth-
odist, the constitutionality of the historic preservation of churches is still being
argued, despite the decision in First Covenant. First United Methodist Church
of Seattle, 887 P.2d at 473.
63. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 121.
64. First Covenant I, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded,
499 U.S. 901 (1991), affd on reh'g, First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash.
1992).
65. Carmella, supra note 34, at 55 (noting efforts to gain religious exemp-
tion in Pennsylvania and New York).
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Although some churches and clergy support historic
preservation,67 others deeply oppose it. 68 Church members
sometimes use landmark designation in attempts to keep
churches open,69 questioning the judgment of church elders
in how best to use financial resources.70 Churches often see
landmark designation as a financial burden, which has di-
verted money from more important programs 71 and shifted
the church's focus from its congregation to its architecture.72
Churches also argue that landmark designation prevents
them from responding to changes in their congregations or
missions.7 3 Some religious organizations view any govern-
ment regulation as intruding on church autonomy. 4 Others
view preservation as impermissibly involving government in
church affairs ranging from the design of areas of worship 75
to requiring that churches provide detailed information, in-
cluding finances, religious doctrine, and mission, when apply-
ing for hardship exemptions.76
66. Id. (noting Chicago's exemption of churches from historic preservation);
Weinstein, supra note 28, at 114-15.
67. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 94 (noting that some church leaders, recog-
nizing the theological importance of maintaining a linkage with the past, sup-
port historic preservation).
68. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Battle of St. Bart's Goes to Landmarks
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1984, at BI (statement of the Bishop of New York,
Paul Moore, Jr.) (The "Christian church must be free to carry out the commands
laid upon us by Jesus Christ .... St. Bartholomew's seeks to carry out its
ministry... and cannot do so unless a secure new source of revenue can be
found.").
69. See, e.g., Michael Hirsley, Pucinski Goes to Bat for Shuttered Church,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1990, Chicagoland at 2 (discussing parishioners who, in an
effort to keep their church open, joined in a lawsuit to keep Chicago from giving
a blanket exemption to the historic preservation of churches); Jodi Wilgoren,
Council Acts to Take Church off Historic Roll, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1996, at B3
(describing an emotional city council hearing at which a parishioner wept as
she spoke, "This church binds us together .... We need to keep our memories.
We need to keep unity.").
70. See, e.g., Anne Keegan, Chicago Razing its Past along with Churches,
CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1988, at 1 (quoting a parishioner: "I don't think it's fair
.... If our priests can run around and raise money to build a church in Nicara-
gua, why can't they help save one in Chicago?").
71. Dunlap, supra note 68, at B1 (quoting Bishop Moore: "We are weighing
aesthetics against the housing, feeding and caring of the poor, elderly and
homeless.").
72. Carmella, supra note 34, at 48.
73. Id. at 47-48.
74. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 110.
75. Carmella, supra note 34, at 52.
76. Id.
E. Dissonance in the Courts: Historic Preservation and
Free Exercise
At the time AB 133 was passed, the tension between
churches and historic preservation had escalated into the
courts. 7 Complicating matters was the controversial United
States Supreme Court holding in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith,"8 which established
a new test for free exercise challenges, '7 9 replacing that of
Sherbert v. Verner.8 0 In the post-Smith environment, courts
did not agree on a standard under which free exercise and the
historic preservation of churches could be judged.8 ' This dis-
sonance can clearly be seen in the following detailed summa-
ries of Saint Bartholomew's v. New York City8 2 and First Cov-
enant Church v. Seattle,8 neither decided by the United
States Supreme Court. These two cases provide insight into
the myriad issues surrounding the historic preservation of
churches and the ways in which legislation could address
some of these issues.
1. Saint Bartholomew's: A Federal Court Applies the
Free Exercise Test of Smith
Saint Bartholomew's is an Episcopal Church in New
York City.8 * Built in 1919, the church building sits on very
valuable land8 5 and has been described as having "one of the
77. See, e.g., Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 348; First Covenant II,
840 P.2d 174, 174 (Wash. 1992).
78. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1991).
79. According to Smith, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an indi-
vidual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability, on the ground that the law proscribes... conduct that this religion
prescribes." Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)) (Stevens, J., concurring). This standard was the basis for the test used
in Saint Bartholomew's.
80. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). According to Sherbert v. Verner, burdens on free
exercise are allowed only if justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 406.
Some state courts, such as the First Covenant court, continue to apply the test
of Sherbert v. Verner. First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174, 182 (Wash. 1992).
81. See, e.g., Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 348; First Covenant II,
840 P.2d 174, 203 (Wash. 1992). The federal court in Saint Bartholomew's used
a standard based on Smith, and the state supreme court in First Covenant used
the pre-Smith, Sherbert test. See infra notes 79-80.
82. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 348.
83. First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
84. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 351.
85. Margot Hornblower, Church Against City: St. Bartholomew's Fight to
Build a Skyscraper, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1984, at C1.
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most remarkable ecclesiastical designs produced in the
United States." 6 The church also owns the seven-story Com-
munity House building next door, which was designed to com-
plement the church and was built soon after.87 The church
building and Community House were designated landmarks,
without objection by the clergy or congregation, in 1967.88 In
1983, the church decided to demolish Community House and
replace it with a fifty-nine story, mirrored tower to be built by
a private developer.8 9 The church was to receive millions of
dollars a year for the lease of the land, which would fund
maintenance of the church as well as community activities
such as soup kitchens and homeless shelters.90
Twice the church applied to the Landmarks Commission
for permission to replace Community House-the second
time reducing the proposed height of the tower to forty-seven
stories 9 1-and each time was denied. 92 The church then filed
for a hardship exception based on the financial needs of the
church and the cost of maintenance and repairs to the church
and Community House.93 This application was also denied,
and in 1986 the church filed suit, claiming in part that New
York City's landmarks law violated the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses by "excessively ... entangling the gov-
ernment in religious affairs."94
On the free exercise claim, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged that landmark designation "drasti-
cally restricted the Church's ability to raise revenues to carry
out its various charitable and ministerial programs."9 5 How-
ever, citing Smith's free exercise test-w"[t]he right of free ex-
ercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes ... conduct that his reli-
gion prescribes"96 -the court found the landmarks law to be
86. Id. (quoting Richard Longstreth, chairman of the Society of Architec-
tural Historians' preservation committee).
87. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 351.
88. Id.
89. Dunlap, supra note 68, at B1.
90. Hornblower, supra note 85, at Cl.
91. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 352.
92. Id. at 351-52.
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 355.
96. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 354.
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constitutional. 97 The court found that New York City's
landmark preservation ordinance 98 was neutral and gener-
ally applicable and that the adverse impact of landmark
designation on the church's finances was simply an incidental
effect of that law. 99 Without proof of "discriminatory motive,
coercion in religious practice, or the Church's inability to
carry out its religious mission in its existing facilities," as re-
quired by Smith, no First Amendment violation had
occurred. 100
On the church's establishment claim-that the ordinance
involved an excessive degree of entanglement between church
and state-the court again found no constitutional viola-
tion.101 Citing the United States Supreme Court, the court
found that the degree of interaction did not rise to the level of
entanglement because the only matters scrutinized by gov-
ernment entities were architectural and financial.
10 2
2. First Covenant: A State Supreme Court Rejects
Smith
On the same day that the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on Saint Bartholomew's,10 3 the Court va-
cated judgment in another case involving the historic preser-
vation of churches, First Covenant,10 4 and sent it back to the
Washington Supreme Court for review in light of Smith. '
0 5
First Covenant Church was historically designated
under Seattle's Landmarks Preservation Ordinance in 1981,
against the church's objections.10 6 While First Covenant con-
tinued to object to its designation as a landmark, the local
Landmarks Preservation Board adopted controls over its ex-
terior.107 In 1985, Seattle's city council adopted an ordi-
nance'08 designating the church as a landmark and requiring
97. Id.
98. Id. at 355-56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 355.
101. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 356 n.4.
102. Id.
103. Comm. to Oppose Sale v. City of New York, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
104. City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 499 U.S. 901 (1991).
105. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1991).
106. First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174, 177 (Wash. 1992).
107. Id. at 209.
108. Id.
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First Covenant to get a certificate of approval before making
certain alterations to the exterior of the church.10 9 The ordi-
nance contained an exemption for religious buildings; the ex-
emption gave control of liturgically-related architectural
changes to churches, however it still required review by the
Landmarks Preservation Board. 110
First Covenant filed suit, claiming that Seattle's
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance was an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and
that the ordinance designating First Covenant a landmark
was void. 11 The Washington Supreme Court, initially bas-
ing its free exercise analysis on pre-Smith decisions, found
that historic preservation burdened free exercise and was not
a compelling state interest. Consequently, the court origi-
nally held that the two ordinances violated state and federal
constitutions. 112
On remand and under direction by the United States
Supreme Court to reconsider the case in light of the Smith
decision, 1 3 the Washington Supreme Court discussed Smith
but declined to apply its test. The court felt that First Cove-
nant fell within exceptions to the Smith rule and therefore
required application of strict scrutiny. 1 14 Although the court
believed that it could simply distinguish Smith from First
Covenant and base its decision solely on federal grounds, it
chose to rest its decision on independent state grounds as
well," 5 thereby ensuring that the decision would not be re-
viewed by the United States Supreme Court. 1 -6 The court
chose to base its decision, in part, in state law because it
found Smith "uncertain"-departing as it does from long-es-
tablished law and adopting a test that "places free exercise in
a subordinate, instead of preferred, position.""
7
The Washington Supreme Court in First Covenant held,
on remand, that Seattle's ordinances "impose unconstitu-
tional administrative and financial burdens on First Cove-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174, 177-78 (Wash. 1992).
112. Id. at 178.
113. Id.
114. Id. 178-83.
115. Id. at 184-87.
116. First .Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174, 188 (Wash. 1992).
117. Id. at 187.
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nant's free exercise of religion."" 8 In addition, the court
found that landmark ordinances do not further a compelling
state interest and thus do not provide a justification for their
impermissible burdens. 119 The court reinstated its original
holding that the landmark ordinances violate the state and
federal constitutional free exercise guarantees, adding that
"Smith does not compel a different result."
120
3. Ongoing Challenges to the Constitutionality of the
Historic Preservation of Churches
Also of note are three ongoing cases involving the First
Amendment and the historic preservation of church buildings
and other church-owned property. In Flores v. Boerne,'12 1 a
Texas church was denied a remodeling permit because its
building was a candidate for historic preservation. The arch-
diocese sued, basing its case on the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act.122 A district court judge declared the Act an un-
constitutional congressional foray into judicial territory.123
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the
Act constitutional and has remanded the case for further
consideration. 124
In a second ongoing case, First United Methodist v. Seat-
tle Landmarks Preservation Board,125 the Washington courts
continue to address constitutional questions even after the
state supreme court's decision in First Covenant.126 The
118. Id. at 188.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
122. Id. at 356; Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(Supp. 1996) ("RFRA"). RFRA was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's
Smith decision. The Act requires that the state prove a compelling interest in
order to restrict religious exercise. Id.
123. Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357.
124. Flores v. City of Boerne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
125. See First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Examiner for
the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 887 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995),
modified, No. 33408-5-I, 1995 Wash. App. LEXIS 88, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar.
7, 1995).
126. First Covenant I, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded,
499 U.S. 901 (1991), affd on reh'g, First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash.
1992).
2251996]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
third case is analyzed below-the recent challenge to the con-
stitutionality of California's AB 133.127
F. Legislative Efforts to Address Historic Preservation of
Church Property
There have been several legislative efforts at both state
and local levels to address the controversy over the historic
preservation of church property.128 State legislatures in New
York 12 ' and Pennsylvania' 30 have defeated bills much like
AB 133, which would have prohibited the landmark designa-
tion of churches without owner consent.' 3'
Several local governments have rewritten ordinances to
exempt churches from preservation. 132 In 1987, Chicago re-
sponded to a controversial attempt to historically designate a
church by passing an ordinance that prohibits the designa-
tion of churches as landmarks without owner consent.' 3 3 The
ordinance also forbids the landmark designation of church in-
teriors and provides a hardship exemption available to all
non-profit property owners.13 4 Although the constitutionality
of the ordinance was challenged as violating the Establish-
ment Clause by the National Trust for Historic Preservation
in Alger v. Chicago, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, and the suit was dismissed. 35
127. East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
128. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 113-14.
129. In its 1983-84 session, the New York Legislature considered a bill
broader than AB 133. Id. Unlike AB 133, which requires church consent only
prior to designation of non-commercial church property, the New York bill
would have required owner consent prior to the designation of any church prop-
erty. Id. Reflecting the division within the religious community over the pres-
ervation of church property, not all religious leaders supported the bill and it
was defeated. Id.
130. The 1989 Pennsylvania bill was also slightly broader than AB 133, re-
quiring owner consent for the designation of any property "owned and used by a
... religious organization in furtherance of its religious purposes." Id. at 113-14
(quoting Pa. S.B. No. 1228 §§ 1-2 (1989)). AB 133 affects only non-commercial
church property. Id. at 114. Again opposed by some church leaders, the bill
was defeated. Id.
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id.
133. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 114.
134. Id.
135. Alger v. City of Chicago, 753. F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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In 1989, New York City adopted a plan supported by
preservationists that created a Hardship Review Panel.13
Although the panel's review guidelines give "significant pro-
tection"1 37 to tax-exempt organizations in the landmark
designation process, it has rarely overturned the Landmarks
Commission's decisions. 138 The city chose not to adopt an al-
ternative plan, proposed at the same time and supported by
religious organizations, 139 that defined hardship broadly and
would have effectively eliminated the city's ability to desig-
nate as a landmark property owned by any tax-exempt
organization. 40
In 1995, under pressure to allow changes to an Armenian
Apostolic Church,14 ' the city council of a Los Angeles suburb
voted to exempt churches from restrictions on alterations to
designated landmarks.' 42 In 1996, that same city adopted an
ordinance that allowed churches to be removed from the his-
toric register. 43 The ordinance is even broader than AB 133,
which does not apply retroactively to churches already
designated. "44
136. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 114-15.
137. Id. at 104-05.
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id. at 114-15.
140. Id.
141. Among changes to the neoclassical building proposed by the congrega-
tion were: adding an "eastern-style dome," enlarging the sanctuary, moving the
altar, and adding a parking garage. Steve Ryfle, Cultures Clash over Glendale
Church Building, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at B1. Archbishop Sarkissian of
Saint Mary's Armenian Apostolic Church "warned that rejecting the church's
request to be freed from the ordinance could open up a rift between the Arme-
nian community and [the] city government." This is no small threat-Glen-
dale's Armenian population is estimated to be more than 40,000. Steve Ryfle,
Historic Churches Win Exemption: Council Votes to Remove Religious Build-
ings from Regulations Governing Alterations to Designated Landmarks, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at B5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
142. Steve Ryfle, Historic Churches Win Exemption: Council Votes to Re-
move Religious Buildings from Regulations Governing Alterations to Designated
Landmarks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995, at B5, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Majpap File.
143. Glendale, Cal., Ordinance 5110 (Mar. 5, 1996) (amending Glendale City
Code §§ 15.20.055, 15.20.060).
144. AB 133 amended California Government Code sections 25373 and
37361 to read, in part, "[n]othing in this subdivision shall be construed to in-
fringe on the authority of any legislative body to enforce special conditions and
regulations on any property designated prior to January 1, 1994...." CAL.
GoV'T CODE §§ 25373(e), 37361(e) (Deering Supp. 1995).
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G. The Passage of AB 133
In 1994, when the California State Legislature enacted
AB 133, it was against a backdrop of dissonant opinions be-
tween state and federal courts on free exercise and the his-
toric preservation of churches. 14 5 AB 133 amended the state
code to give religious organizations an absolute veto over
whether their property could be historically designated by lo-
cal government, 146 but did not apply retroactively.1 47 This
amendment was enacted at the behest of the Catholic Diocese
145. See, e.g., Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2; First Covenant I, 787 P.2d
1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), afld on reh'g,
First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
146. California Government Code § 37361, subdivision (b) reads, in part,
that city legislative bodies may "provide for places, buildings, structures, works
of art, and other objects, having a special character or special historical or aes-
thetic interest or value, special conditions or regulations for their protection,
enhancement, perpetuation or use . . . ." CAL. GOVT CODE § 37361 (Deering
Supp. 1995). California Government Code § 25373, subdivision (b) reads, in
part, that county boards of supervisors are authorized to "provide special condi-
tions or regulations for the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, or use of
places, sites, buildings, structures, works of art and other objects having a spe-
cial character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value." CAL. GOVT
CODE § 25373 (Deering Supp. 1995).
AB 133 amended subdivision (d) of Government Code §§ 25373 and 37361
to read, in part, that
[slubdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by
any association or corporation that is religiously affiliated and not or-
ganized for private profit, whether the corporation is organized as a
religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided that
both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the sub-
division to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it
will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the asso-
ciation or corporation of economic return on its property, the rea-
sonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in
the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995). According to this
amendment, all that a religious organization need do to exempt its property
from landmark designation is object to the designation and select a reason for
its objection from subdivision (d)(2) in a public, but non-governmental, forum.
§§ 25373, 37361.
147. Subdivision (e) of §§ 25373 and 37361 was amended to read, in part,
that "nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to infringe on the authority
of any legislative body to enforce special conditions and regulations on any
property designated prior to January 1, 1994, or to authorize any legislative
body to override the determination made pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivi-
sion 84(d)." §§ 25373, 37361.
of San Francisco'"8 to "ensure the protection of religious free-
dom" as guaranteed by the United States and California Con-
stitutions.'49 The legislation was written by San Francisco
Assemblyman and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, 150 now
Mayor of San Francisco, 15 after that city's Catholic diocese
closed nine churches and "arous[ed] preservationists' fears
that [the churches might] be sold, demolished, or remod-
eled." 1 52 The legislation was supported by a number of
churches and religious organizations and opposed by historic
preservationists who argued, among other things, that the
legislature was being "used to interfere in a San Francisco
controversy." 
1 53
H. Relevant Establishment Clause Case Law
The Establishment15 4 and Free Exercise 55 Clauses of
the First Amendment bind the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. 56 The conflict over AB 133 mirrors the tension
between the Religion Clauses: Does AB 133 simply remove
interference or discrimination against religion (in the name
of free exercise), or does it endorse or support religion (as pro-
hibited by the Establishment Clause)? Justice O'Connor
summed up this conflict in a criticism of the long-standing
Lemon 157 test for constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause:
148. Adams, supra note 4, at A4.
149. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch 1199 § 1 ("AB 133"). The Legislature provided
that the Act "ensure[s] the protection of religious freedom guaranteed by Sec-
tion 4 of Article I of the California Constitution, and by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution." CAL. GOVT CODE § 37361, Note (Deering
Supp. 1995).
150. John King & Clarence Johnson, Brown's Shining Moment -New Mayor
Takes Over, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1996, at Al, A13 (describing Willie Brown, the
former Assembly Speaker, as the "state's most powerful Democrat").
151. Id. (detailing Brown's mayoral inauguration).
152. Adams, supra note 4, at A4.
153. California Committee Analysis, AB 133, Assembly Floor Hearing, Aug.
30, 1994.
154. U.S. CONST, amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion. .. ").
155. U.S. CONST, amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion].").
156. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481 (1994).
157. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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[R]igid application of the Lemon test would invalidate leg-
islation exempting religious observers from generally ap-
plicable government obligations. By definition, such legis-
lation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the
free exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial defer-
ence to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free
exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establish-
ment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be
viewed as an "accommodation" of free exercise rights.
15 8
In another United States Supreme Court case, the decision
noted that "[tihe Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other."' 59
There is no direct precedent to the case challenging AB
133,160 nor has the judge in the case provided a basis for his
grant of summary judgment. 16 1 Consequently, this comment
will examine the constitutionality of AB 133 in light of (1)
case law linked to the Establishment Clause, 162 and (2) the
complicated state of free exercise jurisprudence. 163 Some of
the cases used in this comment were derived from the Plain-
tiffs' and State's motions16 1 in the challenge to AB 133,165
others from law review articles 166 and a survey of the subject
matter.
158. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
160. See Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. Califor-
nia, No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
161. Without comment, Judge Joe S. Gray granted summary judgment to
the plaintiffs on April 5, 1996. East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
162. See discussion infra Part IV.
163. See discussion supra Part II.E.
164. See Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. Califor-
nia, No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996); Defendant State of Califor-
nia's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
165. Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
166. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 28; Carmella, supra note 34.
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1. The Federal Establishment Clause and the Lemon
Test
For a number of years, courts have applied the test eluci-
dated in Lemon v. Kurtzman16 7 in deciding whether govern-
ment action violated the Establishment Clause. 168 In Lemon,
the United States Supreme Court found that a Pennsylvania
statute that allowed the state to pay non-public schools to
provide secular educational services was unconstitutional
under the Religion Clauses. 169 Most of the non-public schools
from which the services were purchased were affiliated with
the Catholic Church.170 In deciding the case, the Court con-
sidered the "cumulative criteria" developed by the Court over
the years.1 7 1 Those cumulative criteria now compose the
Lemon test.
172
In order for a statute to be constitutional under Lemon,
the government must show that its action (1) serves a secular
purpose, (2) has a primary secular effect, and, (3) avoids ex-
cessive state entanglement with religion. 17 3 If the govern-
ment fails to satisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, its
action violates the Establishment Clause. 174 Those currently
challenging AB 133 claim that the law fails all three prongs
of the Lemon test and thus violates the Establishment
Clause. 175 The State of California claims that AB 133 passes
all three prongs and thus passes Establishment Clause
muster. 1
76
167. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
168. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 156. See also supra text accompanying
notes 177-204.
169. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 612.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 612-13.
174. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 847 (1989).
175. See Plaintiffs' Joint Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. Califor-
nia, No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
176. See Defendant State of California's Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, East Bay Asian Local Dev.
Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 1996).
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a. The First Prong of the Lemon Test: Secular
Purpose
In this comment, two cases will be analyzed in consider-
ing the first prong of the Lemon test (secular purpose) in the
challenge to AB 133. In Edwards v. Aguillard,177 the Court
applied the Lemon test to the Louisiana Creationism Act,
which forbade the teaching of the theory of evolution in public
schools unless the theory of "creation science" was also
taught. 17 The Court found that although the Creationism
Act's stated purpose was to protect academic freedom, 179 the
Act was not designed to further that goal and was thus un-
constitutional based on the secular purpose prong of
Lemon.' 80 The Court's decision was based on the Act's legis-
lative history and analysis of the Creationism Act itself.'181
Although the Court in Aguillard found no secular pur-
pose to Louisiana's Creationism Act, the Court's usual defer-
ence to legislative intent is reflected in an earlier case, Muel-
ler v. Allen.' 82 In Mueller, a case involving a Minnesota Act
that allows parents to deduct public or private school ex-
penses, including those for parochial schools, the United
States Supreme Court applied the Lemon test and found the
Act constitutional.18 3 In considering the first prong of the
Lemon test, the Court spent little time on whether the Act
had a secular purpose 8 4 and noted that this cursory look re-
flected "at least in part, our reluctance to attribute unconsti-
tutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible
secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned
from the face of the statute."8 5
b. The Second Prong of the Lemon Test: Primary
Secular Effect
The second prong of the Lemon test, whether a statute
has the primary effect of advancing religion, 8 6 will be viewed
177. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
178. Id. at 581.
179. Id. at 586.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 586-89.
182. 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
183. Id. at 390-94.
184. Id. at 394-95.
185. Id.
186. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
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in the context of Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, s7
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.'88 and Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock. 18 9 In Amos, the Court applied the Lemon test and
held that the exemption of churches from a provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protecting employees from
religious discrimination, did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 190 In considering the second prong of the Lemon test,
the Court said, "[a] law is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it allows churches to advance religion, which is their
very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under
Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself
has advanced religion through its own activities and
influence."' 91
In Texas Monthly, a Texas statute exempted certain pub-
lications-only religious periodicals and books published or
distributed by a religious faith-from sales and use taxes.
192
In holding that the tax was unconstitutional, the Court found
that the fact that a statute benefits religion does not neces-
sarily deprive the statute of an "overriding secular purpose or
effect, " "' but in this case, only religion was benefitted and
therefore the statute had the effect of advancing religion.
The Court went on to note that in some cases where religion
benefits from governmental action,
[Blenefits derived by religious organizations flowed to a
large number of nonreligious groups as well. Indeed, were
those benefits confined to religious organizations, they
could not have appeared other than as a state sponsorship
of religion; if that were so, we would not have hesitated to
strike them down for lacking a secular purpose and
effect. 194
In Larkin, a Massachusetts statute gave churches the
power to prevent the issuance of a liquor license for any es-
tablishment within 500 feet.'9 5 Applying the Lemon test, the
187. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
188. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
189. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
190. Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-30.
191. Id. at 337 (emphasis omitted).
192. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
193. Id. at 11.
194. Id.
195. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
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Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.1 96 Under
the second prong of Lemon, the Court found the statute to
have the effect of advancing religion, 197 saying that because
the statute held the churches' decision-making to no stan-
dards, that power could be used for "explicitly religious
goals." 9 ' In addition, the Court found that "the mere ap-
pearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to
religion."' 99
c. The Third Prong of the Lemon Test:
Entanglement of Church and State
The third prong of Lemon, whether a statute impermissi-
bly entangles church and state, will be viewed in the context
of Larkin and Amos. In Larkin, the Court found that the
statute "conferring veto power over government licensing au-
'2001thority" °° unconstitutionally entangled church and state.2 ° '
The Court noted that "[tihe Framers did not set up a system
of government in which important, discretionary governmen-
tal powers would be delegated to or shared with religious
institutions. 20 2
In Amos, the Court found that exempting religious orga-
nizations from liability for religious discrimination under Ti-
tle VII did not violate the third prong of the Lemon test.20 3
The Court instead found that the statute lessened entangle-
ment because it avoided "the kind of intrusive inquiry into
religious belief that the District Court engaged in in this
case."
204
2. Kiryas Joel: Another Federal Establishment Clause
Test Emerges
More recently, a different test was used by the Supreme
Court in evaluating an Establishment Clause case. The vil-
196. Id. at 123, 127.
197. Id. at 126.
198. Id. at 125.
199. Id. at 125-26.
200. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125.
201. Id. at 126.
202. Id. at 127.
203. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
204. Id.
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lage of Kiryas Joel is a religious enclave in New York
State.2 °5 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet,20 6 a state statute created a special school
district that followed exactly the boundary of the religious en-
clave and had the effect of providing publicly-funded special
education services exclusively to that village's handicapped
children.2 ° v
In deciding the case, the Court relied on a "constitutional
command."20 8 "[P]roper respect for both the Free Exercise
and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a
course of 'neutrality' toward religion,.., favoring neither one
religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over
nonadherents." 20 9 Using this standard, the United States
Supreme Court found that the statute violated the Establish-
ment Clause.210 In addition, the Court noted that a state
may not "delegate its civic authority to a group chosen accord-
ing to a religious criterion."211 Although there is support in
the Court for replacing the Lemon test with the standard
used in Kiryas Joel,212 it is not yet clear whether the Court
has completely abandoned Lemon.
3. The California Constitution's Religion Clauses
The challenge to AB 133 must also be considered in light
of the California Constitution.21 3 In Sands v. Morongo Uni-
fled School District,214 the California Supreme Court consid-
ered whether prayers at high school graduation ceremonies
violated the state and federal constitutions. 21 ,5 The court
found the graduation prayers violated the Federal Constitu-
205. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481 (1994).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2487.
209. Id.
210. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2492.
211. Id. at 2488.
212. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or pref-
erence are guaranteed .... The legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." Cal. Const. art. I, § 4.
214. 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied., 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
215. Id. at 810.
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tion because they violated both the effect and entanglement
prongs of the Lemon test." 6
The court found the graduation prayers violated the
state constitution as well,21 7 noting that the California Con-
stitution provides for even greater separation of church and
state than does the Federal Constitution.21 8 Justice Mosk
said in his Sands concurrence that, under the preference
clause of the state constitution, 21 9 "[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether government has granted a benefit to a religion or
religion in general that is not granted to society at large.
Once government bestows that differential benefit on reli-
gion, it has acted unconstitutionally in this state."22 °
In Lucas Valley Homeowners Association v. County of
Marin,22 the California Court of Appeals considered, in part,
whether a board of supervisors' approval of an exception to a
county code, which allowed the conversion of a home into a
synagogue, was an unconstitutional preference or permissible
accommodation.222 The court quoted Justice Mosk's state-
ment of the standard for violation of the state's establishment
clause,223 but later narrowed it by defining a "zone of accom-
modation."224 This zone tempers the broad scope of the Pref-
erence Clause, 225 "[w]e can conceive what might be viewed as
accommodation under federal law would be an illegal prefer-
ence in this state. In California, it appears [that] the zone of
religious accommodation does not extend beyond what is nec-
essary to avert discrimination or prevent a free exercise
216. Id. at 813-19.
217. Id. at 820-21.
218. See id. at 820 (noting that the establishment clause of the California
Constitution is "virtually identical" to that of the Federal Constitution). The
California Constitution also has two further guarantees of the separation of
religion and government, in Articles I and XVI. CAL. CONST. art. I, XVI. See
also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("free exercise and enjoyment of religion without
discrimination or preference"); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ([n]either the Legisla-
ture, nor.., other municipal corporation, shall ever... grant anything to or in
aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose . . .
219. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
220. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 840 (Cal. 1991), cert.
denied., 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
221. 284 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1991).
222. Id.
223. Sands, 809 P.2d at 840.
224. Lucas Valley, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 436 n.8.
225. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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abuse."226 In view of this, the court noted that synagogue
members would not be unconstitutionally burdened if they
were not allowed to locate their synagogue at a specific loca-
tion because of a county code.227 This noncoercive, neutral
government action simply made it more onerous for members
of the synagogue to practice their religion, but did not violate
free exercise.228
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
AB 133 was the California Legislature's response to the
increasing strife between churches and historic preservation
and to the increased pressure from churches for protection
from landmark designation. Summary judgment has been
granted to the plaintiffs in a challenge to the Act, but has
been appealed by the State. Thus, the question remains: Are
AB 133 and local legislative acts229 granting only churches an
exemption from historic preservation unconstitutional viola-
tions of the federal or state Establishment Clauses, or do they
simply lift an unconstitutional free exercise burden?
This comment suggests that AB 133 and like acts are un-
constitutional, and proposes guidelines for alternative legis-
lation.2 30 Legislation written within these guidelines would
avoid many of the constitutional questions of AB 133 and ad-
dress some of the free exercise concerns of churches. The in-
herent tension between the Religion Clauses, however,
makes it unlikely that any legislation could completely sat-
isfy both interests.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. AB 133 and the Lemon Test
1. The First Prong: Secular Purpose
To satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test, a statute
must have a secular purpose: 231 the government's actual
purpose may not be to "endorse or disapprove of religion."
232
The stated purpose of AB 133 is to "ensure the protection of
226. Lucas Valley, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 436 n.8.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 436.
229. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
230. See discussion infra Parts IV., V.
231. Galloway, Jr., supra note 174, at 854.
232. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
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religious freedom guaranteed" by the state and federal consti-
tutions.233 This purpose is to be achieved by exempting any
church-owned, non-commercial property from landmark
designation.234
The secular purpose prong is usually easily met,23
5 with
courts giving great deference to state legislatures if "a plausi-
ble secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned
from the face of the statute."236 In order to show that the
legislative intent of AB 133 or a like act was indeed secular,
and that the purpose was "sincere and not a sham,"2 37 the
government would have to show that the act furthered its
goal of ensuring the protection of religious freedom.2 8 Con-
sequently, the government would have to show that the his-
toric preservation of churches in some way threatens reli-
gious freedom.
Although there is little consensus on whether the historic
preservation of churches violates the Religion Clauses,23 s
there are some areas of preservation that courts agree impli-
cate free exercise issues. For instance, the court in Saint
Bartholomew's grounded its decision partly in the fact that
the church had not proved that New York City's landmark
regulations had prevented the church from carrying out its
"religious and charitable mission in its current buildings."240
If the city's regulations had done so, the church would have
prevailed on its free exercise claims 241 based on Supreme
Court precedent.24 2
233. 1994 Cal. Stat. ch 1199 § 1 ("AB 133").
234. Subdivision (d) of Government Code § 25373 and subdivision (c) of Gov-
ernment Code § 37361 were amended to read, in part, that "[slubdivision (b)
shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by any association or corpora-
tion that is religiously affiliated .... " CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373 (d), 37361 (c)
(Deering Supp. 1995).
235. Galloway, Jr., supra note 174, at 855.
236. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
237. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987).
238. Id. at 587.
239. See, e.g., Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2; First Covenant I, 787 P.2d
1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), aff'd on reh'g,
First Covenant II, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (conflicting opinions on free exer-
cise and the historic preservation of churches).
240. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 351.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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AB 133 seems to sweep more broadly than necessary to
"ensure the protection of religious freedom" 24 3 by exempting
from historic preservation not only church buildings but any
non-commercial property owned by a religious organiza-
tion.244 Under AB 133, if the Saint Bartholomew's situation
presented itself in California, the church would be allowed to
tear down the Community House (as the building is a "non-
commercial" property)24 5 and build the skyscraper, even
though the Community House was not essential to practicing
the religion and therefore not protected from interference by
free exercise. The court in Saint Bartholomew's specifically
held that restraining the church's ability to raise revenue
through the landmark designation of the Community House
did not "implicate the Free Exercise Clause."246
Before they were amended by AB 133 to exempt
churches, California Government Code sections 25373 and
37361 would have allowed the landmark designation of a
church whether or not the designation unconstitutionally
prevented the church from carrying out its mission. As
amended by AB 133, the code would not allow landmark
designation of a church or church-owned non-commercial
building to prevent a religious organization from carrying out
its mission, as long as the organization asked for an exemp-
tion. Therefore, despite the new statute's unnecessarily
broad scope, it appears that AB 133 furthers its stated goal of
ensuring religious freedom,24 7 and would thus satisfy the
first prong of the Lemon test.
2. The Second Prong: Primary Secular Effect
To satisfy the second prong of the Lemon test, the pri-
mary effect of a statute must be secular, not that of advancing
religion.24 8 According to case law, 249 a court must decide
243. See supra note 149.
244. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995).
245. Id.
246. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 355.
247. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch 1199 § 1 ("AB 133"). The Legislature provided
that the Act "ensure[s] the protection of religious freedom guaranteed by Sec-
tion 4 of Article I of the California Constitution, and by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution." Id.
248. Galloway, Jr., supra note 174, at 855.
249. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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whether a statute's effects impermissibly advance religion 250
or are a permissible constitutional accommodation of
religion.25 '
In exempting churches from the historic designation of
not only buildings related to worship but all non-commercial
property,252 AB 133 has several effects. One effect is to re-
lieve churches of the financial and architectural constraints
of landmark designation under which other owners of historic
properties, including other non-profit organizations, must
function. Thus, a church could buy houses in the middle of a
historic district, demolish them, erect an office building with
modern amenities, and compete with surrounding property
owners constrained by historic designation from remodeling
or expanding. Considering that the goal of AB 133 was to en-
sure religious freedom, the effect of allowing. churches to un-
fairly compete in the commercial market with similarly situ-
ated property owners does not appear to be a permissible
accommodation. The church's ability to exempt itself from
historic preservation and build an office, building seems only
very distantly related to free exercise, if at all.
"For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it
must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced
religion through its own activities and influence."253 By cre-
ating a separate, church-run process for deciding the appro-
priateness of their own exemptions,254 AB 133 gives churches
250. See, e.g., Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117; Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
251. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
252. Galloway, Jr., supra note 174, at 845.
253. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
254. Subdivision (d) of Government Code § 25373 and subdivision (c) of Gov-
ernment Code § 37361 were amended to read, in part, that
[slubdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by
any association or corporation that is religiously affiliated ... provided
that both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the sub-
division to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it
will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the asso-
ciation or corporation of economic return on its property, the rea-
sonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in
the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 25373 (d), 37361 (c) (Deering Supp. 1995) (emphasis ad-
ded). Because "public forum" is not defined in sections 25373 or 37361 as the
meeting of a legislative body, such as a city or county Landmarks Commission,
the forum to which the code refers could simply be a church-run community
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255legislative authority over a governmental process. Accord-
ing to Larkin, this granting of authority could be interpreted
as giving governmental approval to religion.2 56 The question
is whether these benefits deprive AB 133 of an "overriding
secular purpose or effect,"257 or simply allow "churches to ad-
vance religion, which is their very purpose."258 In the context
of Larkin, AB 133's grant of authority to churches suggests
that government has given approval to religion and, there-
fore, fails Lemon by advancing religion through the govern-
ment's own activities.
In Amos, which has been described as a "high-water
mark" of religious accommodation,25 9 the Court was not per-
suaded that an exemption was unconstitutional simply be-
cause it applied only to religious organizations. The Court
said that where "government acts with the proper purpose of
lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we
see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged
with benefits to secular entities."260 The Court emphasized,
however, that in order to singularly benefit religion without
offending the Constitution, government must properly act to
lift a regulation burdening free exercise.
AB 133 sweeps more broadly than required to lift any in-
cidental burdens to free exercise by the historic preservation
of church-owned property. For instance, as outlined above,
AB 133 would allow a church to commercially develop prop-
erty free of the confines of landmark designation in the midst
of a historic district, clearly giving it an economic advantage
over other, non-religious property owners. This effect of AB
133 arguably does not lift a burden on free exercise, for as the
court held in Saint Bartholomew's, restraining a church's
ability to raise revenue does not burden free exercise. 261 Fur-
meeting. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54952 (Deering Supp. 1996). Importantly, this un-
defined public forum would be exempt from the strict open meeting require-
ments of the Brown Act. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950 (Deering 1996).
255. California Government Code §§ 37361 and 25373 grant the power to
designate landmarks to cities and counties, not to private parties. CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 25373(b), 37361(b) (Deering 1995).
256. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
257. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989).
258. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
259. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743, 769 (1992).
260. Amos, 438 U.S. at 328.
261. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 355.
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thermore, there is support on both sides of the debate over
the historic preservation of church-owned property for the no-
tion that commercial development should not be constitution-
ally protected.26 2 Because AB 133 singularly benefits religion
without acting to lift a burden to free exercise, it does not
meet the Court's standard in Amos.
Soon after Amos was decided, the Court was less accom-
modating in Texas Monthly, instructing simply that govern-
ment actions could not singularly benefit religion, period. In
Texas Monthly, the Court held that government policies with
secular objectives may incidentally benefit religion, but may
not be so narrowly written as to benefit only religion.263 Dis-
cussing past decisions, the Court noted that if benefits were
narrowly "confined to religious organizations, they could not
[appear as] other than state . . .sponsorship of religion; if
that were so, we would not have hesitated to strike them
down for lacking a secular purpose and effect."264 As the
Supreme Court instructs in Texas Monthly, because AB 133
benefits only religious organizations, this underinclusion
means the statute lacks secular effect. Therefore, according
the Texas Monthly, the statute fails the second prong of
Lemon.
In addition to AB 133 providing exemptions to churches
from historic preservation, it creates an extra-governmental
forum in which the exemption is decided. AB 133 removes
churches from the standard governmental processes of
landmark designation and establishes a separate review in
which churches decide whether their non-commercial prop-
erty is to be designated a landmark.26 5 The statute sets out
no standards on which the decision is to be based, requiring
only that the determination be made in a public, but not gov-
ernmental, forum.2 6  In Larkin, the Court held that a
church's veto power over legislative authority could unconsti-
tutionally effect the advancement of religion because it was
262. Weinstein, supra note 28, at 137 (noting that he and Carmella (author
cited, supra note 34, who strongly supports blanket exemptions from historic
preservation for churches), agree that "commercial development by a religious
institution is undeserving of constitutional protection").
263. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
264. Id. at 11.
265. See CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995).
266. Id.
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"standardless, calling for no reasons, findings, or reasoned
conclusions."267
Although AB 133 requires that a religious organization
make one of three findings for exemption from landmark
designation, like Larkin there are no standards for making
those findings. According to the Court in Larkin, the lack of
standards provided to churches by AB 133 could unconstitu-
tionally effect the advancement of religion, which is imper-
missible under Lemon.
Furthermore, the Court in Larkin found that a statute
providing for the joint exercise of legislative authority be-
tween a church and government had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.268 This sharing of authority provided a "sig-
nificant symbolic benefit to religion" because of the power
conferred. AB 133 bestows on churches two important as-
pects of the governmental process of landmark designation:
both control of the public hearing on whether an exemption
should be allowed and an absolute, unassailable veto. In the
context of Larkin, AB 133 has provided religious organiza-
tions with significant symbolic benefit as well as ceding real
authority. If this were found to be the primary effect of the
statute, it would violate the second prong of Lemon.
It has been noted that the second prong of Lemon is the
hardest prong to satisfy.269 In the context of a pro-accommo-
dation decision like Amos and less accommodating decisions
like Larkin and Texas Monthly, AB 133 would likely fail the
primary effect test. The statute's narrowness of benefit and
the amount of standardless power granted in governmental
decisionmaking would seem to render AB 133 unconstitu-
tional under the second prong of the Lemon test.
3. The Third Prong: Excessive Entanglement
To satisfy the third prong of the Lemon test, a court must
find that the government action does not create excessive en-
tanglement between state and religion.270 This prong impli-
cates the involvement of religious organizations in the gov-
ernmental process 271 of landmark designation under AB 133.
267. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982).
268. Id. at 125-26.
269. Galloway, Jr., supra note 174, at 855-56.
270. Id. at 859.
271. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
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The Court in Amos characterized impermissible entan-
glement as the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief
conducted by a lower court in the same case.2 72 That inquiry
was used to determine whether an activity was religious and
consisted of an examination of finances, management, ritual,
religious beliefs, and tenets. The Court found that exempting
religious organizations from a section of the Civil Rights Act
more completely separated church from state by avoiding this
type of inquiry into religious belief.
The finding in Amos could support the provision of AB
133 that gives religious organizations a role in governmental
decision-making by leaving the inquiry to the churches them-
selves, rather than giving a landmarks commission the power
to inquire into the appropriateness of the exemption. On the
other hand, in Saint Bartholomew's, the court found that the
degree of interaction between the New York City Landmarks
Commission and the church "does not rise to the level of un-
constitutional entanglement" because the only matters scru-
tinized were architectural and financial.273
In Larkin, the Court found that the core rationale under-
lying the Establishment Clause is that of preventing "a fusion
of governmental and religious functions."274 Key to the in-
stant analysis is that the Court in Larkin objected to the stat-
ute's substitution of the "unilateral and absolute power of a
church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative
body acting on evidence and guided by standards" on issues
described as having "significant economic and political impli-
cations."275 This could well describe AB 133's grant of power
to churches.276 In giving churches unilateral and absolute
veto power and their own hearing process, with none of the
government requirements as to agenda, notice, standards, or
public comment, AB 133 fails the third prong of the Lemon
test under both Amos and Larkin.
272. Id.
273. Saint Bartholomew's, supra note 2, at 356 n.4.
274. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982) (quoting Abing-
ton Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
275. Id. at 127.
276. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995).
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B. AB 133 and the Kiryas Joel Test
AB 133 should also be examined in the context of the test
recently used by the United States Supreme Court in evalu-
ating a statute's constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause. The test in Kiryas Joel demands government neu-
trality toward religion: that government not favor the reli-
gious over the non-religious.2"7 The Court in Kiryas Joel
found a statute unconstitutional because it departed from the
"course of neutrality" by delegating government's discretion-
ary authority to a religious group.278 Under AB 133, Califor-
nia also delegated discretionary authority-that which has
long rested with municipal government-to religious organi-
zations.2 9 The Court compared Larkin to Kiryas Joel, noting
that the united civic and religious authority in Larkin28 °
presented an even clearer violation of the Establishment
Clause.28 '
The Court further expounded on government neutrality
towards religion, noting that the "general principle that civil
power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion ... is
well grounded in our case law, as we have frequently relied
explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided
religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establish-
ment Clause challenges."28 2 Making the test even more ap-
plicable to AB 133, the Court compared Kiryas Joel, in which
one religious sect benefitted, to cases involving benefit to reli-
gion as a whole, saying each would be unconstitutional.28 3
Whether Kiryas Joel replaces Lemon as the standard for
Establishment Clause questions remains to be seen; the
United States Supreme Court itself is unsure. In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor praised Kiryas Joel's shift from
Lemon, describing the Lemon test as "rigid."28 4 Justice
Blackmun, however, disagreed that Kiryas Joel represented a
277. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, at 2484-85 (1994).
278. Id.
279. See See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995).
280. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982) (giving churches
an absolute veto over the granting of liquor licenses to establishments within
500 feet of a church).
281. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
282. Id. at 2491.
283. Id. at 2492.
284. Id. at 2485, 2500.
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shift, saying that the holding was firmly grounded in the sec-
ond and third prongs of Lemon.285 What does seem apparent
is that under Kiryas Joel, AB 133 would not survive on two
main issues: the delegation of governmental authority to reli-
gion and the statute's narrow field of benefit.286
C. AB 133 and the California Constitution
The California Supreme Court has found that while fed-
eral case law may help interpret the state's Establishment
Clause, the scope of the clause is determined by state
courts.287 The scope of the state's Establishment Clause has
been described by the court as more protective of the separa-
tion of church and state than is the Federal Constitution.2 8
As Justice Mosk stated in his concurrence in Sands, under
the Preference Clause of the state constitution, "[t]he rele-
vant inquiry is whether government has granted a benefit to
a religion or religion in general that is not granted to society
at large. Once government bestows that differential benefit
on religion, it has acted unconstitutionally in this state."28 9
AB 133 would seem to violate the Preference Clause of
the state constitution, as expounded by Justice Mosk in
Sands,290 by giving religious organizations an absolute veto
over the historic preservation of their non-commercial prop-
erty. This veto and the excuse from the burdens of landmark
designation grant a benefit to religion not given to the rest of
society.
285. Id. at 2494-95.
286. Subdivision (d) of Government Code § 25373 and subdivision (c) of Gov-
ernment Code § 37361 were amended to read, in part, that
[slubdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by
any association or corporation that is religiously affiliated... provided
that both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the sub-
division to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it
will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the asso-
ciation or corporation of economic return on its property, the rea-
sonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in
the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
287. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 820 (Cal. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 840.
290. Id.
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Lucas Valley narrows Justice Mosk's statement of Cali-
fornia's Establishment Clause standard by creating excep-
tions to the Preference Clause in its "zone of religious accom-
modation."291 AB 133's exemption of religious organizations
from landmark designation is not an unconstitutional prefer-
ence - it falls within Lucas Valley's "zone" - if the exemption
prevents an unconstitutional burden on free exercise. But, if
the pre-AB 133 statute were seen only as a noncoercive, neu-
tral government action that did not constitute a free exercise
abuse, 292 AB 133 would create an unconstitutional prefer-
ence, according to the state constitution.
AB 133 does exempt churches from some effects of his-
toric preservation that could be construed as violating the
Free Exercise Clause, such as controls over exterior architec-
tural elements that may reflect religious beliefs and symbols.
But AB 133 also broadly exempts religious organizations
from noncoercive, neutral government actions that do not im-
plicate free exercise. For example, an exemption allowing a
church to replace a historic, non-commercial building with a
modern, commercial building in a historic district does not
implicate free exercise and therefore falls outside Lucas Val-
ley's zone of accommodation.2 93 According to Lucas Valley,
AB 133's exemptions are an impermissible accommodation
under California's Preference Clause.
V. PROPOSAL
AB 133's exemption of church property from historic
preservation is not linked to the lifting of burdens on free ex-
ercise. Instead, the Act gives religious organizations carte
blanche to exempt any non-commercial building from historic
preservation by simply determining, in their own extra-gov-
ernmental process and without any findings required as a ba-
sis for the determination, that they would "suffer substantial
hardship"294 were the building designated a landmark. To
291. Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 284 Cal. Rptr. 427,
436 n.8 (1991).
292. Id. at 436.
293. Id. at 436 n.8.
294. AB 133 amended subdivision (d) of Government Code § 25373 and sub-
division (c) of Government Code § 37361 to read, in part, that
[s]ubdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by
any association or corporation that is religiously affiliated and not or-
ganized for private profit, whether the corporation is organized as a
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survive constitutional inspection, legislation providing for ex-
emptions from landmark designation for religious organiza-
tions must provide standards for exemption that respond to
concomitant burdens on free exercise, and the decision to ex-
empt must be made as part of a governmental process. Only
on this basis could such narrowly-drawn legislation, exempt-
ing only religious organizations, survive the Supreme Court's
standards in Lemon295 or Kiryas Joel.296
Local government in California is currently under great
pressure to exempt church property from historic preserva-
tion.2 s v In the face of a growing hodgepodge of exemptions
based on shaky or non-existent constitutional grounds 298 the
state should adopt uniform guidelines for the exemption of
churches from historic preservation by local government.
Unlike AB 133, however, the legislation should be firmly
grounded in the constitutional tension between the Religion
religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided that
both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the sub-
division to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it
will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the asso-
ciation or corporation of economic return on its property, the rea-
sonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in
the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is
approved.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 25373(d), 37361(c) (Deering Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
295. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 227-72.
296. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481 at 2484-85 (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 273-82.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45. The Glendale City Council,
under intense pressure by the congregation of an Armenian Apostolic Church,
has adopted an ordinance that removes churches from landmark designation.
Id.
In Los Angeles, the city council recently voted to "strip [a Catholic cathe-
dral] of its historic preservation status ... to speed [its] demolition" and allow
the building of a multi-million dollar cathedral complex. Kramer, supra note
14, at Al, A6. Cardinal Mahony, leader of the local archdiocese, has threatened
to "take the church's business elsewhere within the roughly 4 million-member,
three-county archdiocese" if the city blocks the demolition. Id.
298. One of the Los Angeles City Council members who voted to strip the
cathedral of historic status does not appear to have had the Constitution in
mind when he voted. Wilgoren, supra note 69, at B3. Council member Nate
Holden was quoted as saying, "I'm going to vote with the Cardinal .... When I
leave this world, I don't want anything in my way. I don't know how you guys
feel, but I might need a little help. Let the word go forth that I'm on the right
side." Id.
Clauses; the law should balance free exercise burdens with
Establishment Clause concerns-advancement with accom-
modation. In addition, any decision regarding exemptions
from historic preservation-a legitimate public goal-should
be made within the confines of a government process, with
exemptions based on meaningful findings and standards.
Because free exercise and establishment are fluid con-
cepts, with little agreement over their meaning and ever-
changing tests in the courts, the legislature cannot codify ab-
solute standards to guide local government. However, the
California legislature could provide guidance and take steps
toward ensuring that the exemption of California churches
from historic preservation be achieved within a constitutional
framework, within that "zone of religious accomodation" nec-
essary to avoid discrimination or free exercise abuse299 but
also respectful of the Establishment Clause. To that end, the
legislature should: (1) remove AB 133's unconstitutional
amendments to the California Government Code;3 ° ° (2) pro-
hibit blanket exemptions for religious organizations because
they violate the state and federal Establishment Clauses; (3)
require that local government specifically anchor exemptions
in response to the free exercise burdens of historic preserva-
tion; and, (4) allow exemptions to be granted only for "sacred"
buildings in which religious services take place.30 1 This stat-
utory framework would be fine-tuned by the courts, based on
current Free Exercise and Establishment Clause standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although AB 133 may have been successfully challenged,
because summary judgment was granted without comment
and is being appealed, the decision in East Bay v. California
provides little guidance to those battling over the historic
299. Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 284 Cal. Rptr. 427,
436 n.8 (1991).
300. See AB 133 amendments to CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 25373, 37361 (Deering
Supp. 1995). See also supra note 144.
301. These "sacred" buildings, which require the greatest degree of protec-
tion from burdens on free exercise, have been differentiated from buildings in
which other more secular church activities take place by some involved in the
dispute over the historic preservation of churches. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra
note 28.
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preservation of property owned by religious organizations.3 °2
In the meantime, the constitutionality of the historic preser-
vation of church property continues to be fiercely debated,
and church property continues to be exempted from historic
preservation by local legislative acts.3 °3
Based on the Lemon test,3 4 AB 133, which exempts all
noncommercial church property and establishes a church-
run, extragovernmental process controlling historic designa-
tion, appears to be an unconstitutional violation of the state
and federal Establishment Clauses. Although the Act would
probably pass the easiest, first prong of Lemon, it would
likely fail the other two. AB 133 fails the second prong be-
cause the primary effect of the broad scope and standardless
decisionmaking of AB 133 is not secular-it does not serve to
remove an unconstitutional burden from churches but rather
to advance religion.30 5 And AB 133 fails Lemon's third prong,
the entanglement of state and religion, because it takes the
power to designate a landmark from municipalities and gives
churches an absolute veto over a governmental function in an
extragovernmental, church-run process.3 6 Furthermore, AB
133 does not meet the emerging test of neutrality for govern-
ment action in Kiryas Joel3°7 because it improperly favors the
religious over the non-religious-churches over other owners
of historically significant property.
This comment has examined the exemption of church
property from historic preservation in California. Case law,
local legislative acts, and ongoing controversy demand that
the state legislature replace AB 133 with a uniform scheme,
including constitutionally-mandated exemptions, for the his-
toric preservation of churches. A better balance between free
exercise protections and the preservation of our historical
and cultural foundations must be sought; respect for free ex-
302. Judge Joe S. Gray granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on April
5, 1996. East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, No. 95AS02560 (Super.
Ct. Cal. Apr. 5, 1996), appeal docketed, No. C024192 (3rd Cal. Ct. App. July 8,
1996).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 133-45.
304. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 244-65.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
307. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484-85, 2487 (1994).
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ercise is a constitutional mandate, but the future needs the
past.
Madeleine Randal*
* The author would like to thank Liz Randal and Ron Eddow for their
contributions to this comment.

